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A One-Way Ticket Back to the United States:
The Collision of International Extradition
Law and the Death Penalty
Mary K. Martin*
L Introduction
On July 12, 1994, Atif Rafay, accompanied by his friend, Sebastian
Bums, arrived at his family's Bellevue, Washington, home to discover that
both of his parents and his nineteen-year-old sister had been murdered.'
The local police questioned Rafay and Burns, both Canadian citizens and
eighteen at the time, but brought no charges against them.2 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the pair returned to Canada.3 One year later, police arrested the two
teenagers for the murders and detained them in Vancouver, British Colum-
bia, pending an extradition hearing.4 Charged with aggravated first-degree
murder, the pair faced the possibility of the death penalty if extradited to the
United States.' Canada, their native country, abolished the death penalty
in 1976.6
Initially, the British Columbia Superior Court and the Canadian
Minister of Justice approved the extraditions, but the British Columbia
Court of Appeals7 reversed that decision.8 Citing the Canadian Charter of
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
Louisiana State University. Thank you to my parents for all their love and support. Also,
thanks to Professors Geimer and White for their guidance as teachers and their inspiration
as people.
1. Nancy Montgomery, Race Discounted in Slayings, SEATTLE TIMES, July 15, 1994,
atB1.
2. Id
3. Susan Byrnes, Murder Suspects Unruffled, SEATTLE TIMES, July 10, 1995, at B1.
4. Susan Byrnes, Son and Friend Held in TripleSlaying, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995,
at Al.
5. Richard Seven, Extradition Process Begins, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at B1.
6. Bellevue Slaying Case Tests Canada Extradition Law, SEATTLE TIMES, May 12, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 3233018.
7. The British Columbia Court of Appeals is the appellate court to which appeals of
cases decided in the British Columbia Superior Court, a trial level court, are made. PETER
MCCORMICK, CANADA'S COURTS 24 (1994). The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest
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Rights and Freedoms,9 the Court of Appeals refused to extradite the Cana-
dians because of the possibility that they may face the death penalty." An
appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court followed, but that court remains
undecided to date, recently delaying the extradition hearing because of
intervention by Amnesty International." Consequently, Rafay and Burns,
now 22 and 23 respectively, have been in police custody in Vancouver for
over three years."
As of March 31, 1998, 104 countries have abolished the death penalty
in either law or in practice while 91 countries, including the United States,
court in the country. Id.
8. Louis T. Corsaletti, Rafay Hires New Lawyer to Fight Extradition, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1998, at B3.
9. In April of 1982, Canada proclaimed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
[hereinafter Canadian Charter]. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER 10-13 (1996). The Canadian Charter, which is to some
degree analogous to the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution, enumerates a variety
of freedoms and rights. Id. For example, the Canadian Charter provides in part:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of
the press and other media of communication;
c freedom of peaceful assembly; and
freedom of association....
6. (1 very citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada...
7. veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the prificiples of fundamen-
tal justice.
Canada Act 1982, R.S.C., ch. 11, sch. B (1982) (Can.).
10. Jeffrey Simpson, A Bellevue Case vs. Canada's Charter, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 5,
1997. The court based its decision on the provision of the Canadian Charter which gives
Canadian citizens the right to remain in Canada if they so choose. See Canada Act 1982,
R.S.C., ch. 11, sch. B (1982) (Can.).
11. Louis T. Corsaletti, Extradition Hearing Delayed for Rafay, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
10, 1998, at B5. The Canadian Supreme Court postponed the extradition hearings in order
to give all of the involved parties an adequate amount of time to answer the concerns raised
by Amnesty International, namely that Rafay and Burns should not be sent back to the
United States because Canada does not have a death penalty. Id. However, on March 22,
1999, the Supreme Court of Canada heard an appeal to the decision to extradite Rafay and
Burns to the United States. Canada Court Considers Extradition, SEATTLE TIMES, March 23,
1999, at B4, available in 1999 WL 6263345. Attorneys for Rafay and Burns argued that the
two Canadian citizens should not be extradited unless the United States guarantees that the
pair would not be executed if convicted. Id. In replying to the defense's argument, the
federal Justice Department of Canada contended that "Canada should not become a refuge
for criminals wanting to avoid the death penalty." Id. The prosecuting attorney from the
state of Washington has stated that he will not decide whether to charge the two defendants
with capital murder until the Canadian court makes a decision. Id The Supreme Court of
Canada reserved its decision so it could be months before it issues a ruling. Id.
12. Id.
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continue its use.1" With an average of two countries abolishing the death
penalty each year since 1976, abolition is clearly on an upward trend. 4 This
growing movement, coupled with the fact that 74 foreign-nationals are
currently on death row in the United States," presents the question whether
the United States will be able to continue to seek successfully extradition of
foreign-nationals from abolitionist countries without agreeing in advance to
eschew the death penalty. Stated another way, will countries who have
deemed capital punishment inhumane be willing to turn their citizens over
to a country that executed 68 people last year alone?
16
Initially, this article will examine general principles governing extradi-
tion law.' 7 Next, it will discuss important cases involving extraditions
between the United States and other countries and the impact of these
decisions on extradition law in the United States. Finally, this article will
conclude that given the growing importance of human rights in extradition
law, the United States is likely to encounter an increasing number of denials
of extradition by countries opposing capital punishment.
I. A Procedural Overview of Extradition
Extradition is "[t]he surrender by one state or country [requested state]
to another [requesting state] of an individual accused or convicted of an
offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the
other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the surren-
der." 8 Under international law, a country possesses no duty to surrender
a criminal suspect to another country. 9 Consequently, extradition treaties
or a national law of the requested state are necessary in order to invoke the
proper jurisdiction." Generally, these treaties enumerate those offenses to
which the treaty parties agree warrant extradition,2' and contain escape
13. Amnesty International, The Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist
Countries (visited Feb. 21, 1999) < http://www.amnesty.org//ailib/aipub/1998/ACT/
A5000898.htm>.
14. Id
15. Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the
United States (visited Feb. 21, 1999) < http://www.essential.org/dpic/foreignnatl.htm>.
16. - Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty in 1998: Year End Report
(visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/orgs/dpic/yrendrpt98.htm>.
17. Much of this article is grounded in international law, but it still bears significance
for attorneys in Virginia because there have been and continue to be instances where Virginia
attorneys are involved in extradition issues pertinent to their clients or co-defendants of their
clients.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990).
19. WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 205 (2nd ed. 1995).
20. Id
21. Id at 206. For example, the following provision appears in the 1978 Treaty on
1999]
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clauses which empower the requested state with the discretion to deny
extradition.22
A. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
International extradition agreements have traditionally been bilateral
or multilateral treaties.23 Under bilateral agreements, two countries, using
a piecemeal approach, draft an agreement suited to the particular needs of
their situation."4 In contrast, multilateral agreements are typically regional
conventions which create uniform procedures among countries with close
geographical and historical ties.25 Multilateral agreements are beneficial
because they institute standard extradition procedures in a greater number
of countries.26 Nonetheless, these multilateral agreements have been criti-
cized as giving actually "little more" protection to individual rights than
bilateral agreements.27 Specifically, in negotiating these multilateral agree-
ments, countries are arguably pressured into accepting lower standards for
human rights requirements in order to achieve accord within the group.28
B. The Emergence of Human Rights Agreements
Prior to the advent of human rights agreements, suspected criminals
had limited power to challenge their extradition proceedings.29 Under the
doctrine of non-inquiry, the judiciary of the requested state, even at the
beseeching of the suspect, could not review the judicial and penal circum-
stances of the requesting state.3" Instead, the judiciary acceded to the discre
Extradition Between the United States of America and Japan:
Extradition shall be granted in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty for
any offense listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty ... when such an
offense is punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by death, by life
imprisonment, or by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year
or Tor any other offense when such offense is pufishable by the federal laws of
the United States and by the laws of Japan by. death, by life imprisonment, or by
deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year.
Treaty on Extradition, 1978, U.S.-Japan, 31 U.S.T. 892.
22. Id. at 213.
23. GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADmON LAW 20 (International Studies in
Human Rights Vol. 17, 1991).
24. Id
25. Il See Mark E. DeWitt, Comment, Extradition Enigma: Italy and Human Rights
vs. America and the Death Penalty, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 535, 539 (1998).
26. GILBERT, supra note 23, at 25.
27. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 539.
28. See id at 539 & n.20.
29. Id. at 537.
30. Id For further discussion of the doctrine of non-inquiry, see John Quigley, The
Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact ofHuman Rights on Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L.
[Vol. 11:2
EXTRADITION LA W AND THE DEATH PENAL TY
tion of the executive branch which supposedly could give more thoughtful
consideration to foreign policy and to the importance of upholding duties
under treaties."
International human rights agreements, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights32 and the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,33 demand
more from member nations than such exclusive executive control. 4 These
agreements require requested nations to examine the conditions awaiting an
extraditee in the requesting nation and to afford individuals a means by
which to challenge judicially their possible extraditions." Consequently,
some of these agreements have established judicial bodies to which
extraditees can make claims of human rights violations. 6
& COM. REG. 401, 415-16 (1990); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and
the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198,
1198 (1991); David B. Sullivan, Note, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International
Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 116 (1991).
31. Id. at 538. SeeI.A.SHEARER, EXTRADITIONININTERNATIONALLAW 197-98 (1971)
(discussing that only a minority of countries retain exclusive executive control over extradi-
tion while most states use a combination of judicial and executive control; notes that, though
this has not been an issue previously, the growing concern over human rights may change
that fact).
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
33. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
34. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 540.
35. John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rigbts on Extradi-
tion Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401,418-19 (1990). In interpreting the European
Convention, the European Court of Human Rights has stated the fo owing:
[Article 1] cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that,
notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may not surren-
der an individual unless satisfied that the conditions'awaiting him in the country
of destination are in full accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 86 (1989). However, the court later
stated in the Soering decision that:
iThe Contracting Parties are not absolved] from responsibility under Article 3
for all and any foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered outside their
jurisdiction.... the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for
the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be inter-
preted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.
Id. at 86-87. Note also that in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, Convention as to
Boundaries, Suppression of Slave Trade, and Extradition, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No.
119, the United States and Britain concurred that they would provide a judicial hearing for
extraditees. Quigley, supra, at 430.
36. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 28. See European Convention, supra note 33, art. 25(1),
at 236-38 (providing that under this treaty, individuals are permitted to file petitions asserting
violations of the treaty, as long as the state against which the assertion is made has acknowl-
edged that the European Commission or European Court may hear such petitions).
1999]
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C. International Forumsfor Extradition Challenges
As forums for extradition challenges, these international judicial bodies
are not bound by the jurisprudence and rules of national courts." Instead,
these bodies, are able to look to the tenets of human rights agreements,
including "the right to life,"" the prohibition against prolonged arbitrary
detention, and the prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment, in making their decisions.39 The result
of this expansion in extradition law has been the collision of human rights
and capital punishment.4" Countries which continue to impose capital
punishment, such as the United States, are now facing increasing difficulty
in extraditing suspected capital defendants 1 because for many countries the
death penalty has become a human rights violation.42
D. Reassuring "Assurances"
In an attempt to reconcile this difference, retentionist countries, partic-
ularly the United States, have signed extradition treaties with abolitionist
countries which often include a provision similar to the following:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of
the requested Party does not provide for the death penalty in a similar
case, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives assur-
ances satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty will not
be carried out. 3
37. Craig R. Roecks, Comment, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty:
When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a Person Charged with a Capital Crime, 25 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 189, 192-93 (1994).
38. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 6 (2d ed. 1997). There are two major ways in which "the right to life" is
defined. Id. at 8. Some narrowly limit it to such instances as capital punishment, abortion,
disappearances, non-judicial execution and other forms of reckless life-taking by the State.
Id. at 8-9. Others, taking a broader approach, define the "right to life" in economic and social
context such as the right to food, to medical care, and to a healthy environment. Id. at 9.
39. Quigley, supra note 35, at 416 (citing RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 702(d)-(e) (1987); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505
F. Supp. 787,791-92 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on othergrounds sub nom., Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); ICCPR, supra note 29, arts. 7, 14).
40. Roecks, supra note 37, at 231 (stating that there has been a "recent incorporation
of the 'law of extradition' into human rights law").
41. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 542.
42. See SCHABAS, supra note 38, at 2-3. See also discussion supra Part I.
43. Extradition Treaty,June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. 4,28 U.S.T. 227,230, T.I.A.S. No.
8468 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty]. See Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-
Italy, art. 6, 35 U.S.T. 3023, 3031 [hereinafter U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty] (stating that
.extradition shall be refused unless the requesting Party provides such assurances as the
requested Party considers sufficient"); Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Canada, art. 6,
248 [Vol. 1 1:2
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With this language, the requested state may require that the requesting state
provide "assurances" that the death penalty will not be sought." If such
assurances are unsatisfactory to the requested state, it may refuse
extradition. 5
Nonetheless, problems still arise concerning the "assurances" doctrine,
because of the near impossibility of defining what constitutes an "assur-
ance." 4" Consequently, what requested nations have accepted as adequate
"assurances" has varied greatly, thereby adding even more uncertainty to the
determination. 4' The doctrine is also problematic because the adequacy of
the "assurances" is typically a question left to the discretion of executive
officials." Such executive discretion is likely to run contrary to human
rights agreements because the goals of foreign policy may be placed ahead
of the rights and protections of the individual. 49 Therefore, the result is that
even with the "assurances" doctrine, the United States and other retentionist
countries may succeed in securing extradition of some suspects not yet
afforded the protection called for by international human rights agreements.
III. Death Penalty Extradition Cases Face International Scrutiny
Recent international decisions have brought this issue of whether
retentionist countries, particularly the United States, have in fact failed to
preserve the rights of extraditees to the forefront of extradition law. These
decisions highlight the evolving struggle between national death penalty
laws and international human rights agreements. International courts'
treatment of these cases further strengthens the proposition that death
27 U.S.T. 983,989 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty] (providing that "extradition
may be refused unless the requesting State provides such assurances as the requested State
considers sufficient").
44. Quigley, supra note 35, at 431 (citing M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADI-
TION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 460-61 (1974)). See I. A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1971) (citing European Convention, supra note 33, art. 11).
45. IL
46. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 545. See U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, art.
4, at 230 (lacking in any definition of "assurances;" instead only providing that the assurances
must be acceptable to the requested Party). The definition of "assurances" is arguably
whatever it takes to satisfy the requested party. Conceivably, for some countries there may
be no acceptable assurances which satisfy them that the death penalty will not be used against
an extraditee. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.2.
47. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, 19 (finding a
promise to tell the sentencing judge the U.K. did not want the death penalty enforced to be
an adequate assurance as required by the extradition treaty between U.S. and U.K.). The
European Court of Human Rights [hereinafter European Court] heard and decided this case.
48. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14-15 (noting that the Secretary of State
in the United Kingdom has the authority to determine the adequacy of assurances given in
extradition matters).
49. See discussion supra Part I.B.
1999]
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penalty extradition can no longer be evaluated exclusively within national
terms, but now must also address international concerns.
A. The Soering Decision
After being suspected of murdering a couple in Bedford, Virginia, Jens
Soering, a German national, and Elizabeth Haysom, Soering's girlfriend and
the victims' daughter, left the United States and went to the United King-
dom.5" One year later, in 1986, the pair was arrested in the United Kingdom
for a separate offense."' The United States then requested that the pair be
extradited to face murder charges.5 2 Following the United Kingdom's
decision to extradite Soering, he filed a complaint with the European Com-
mission on Human Rights, 3 alleging that his extradition violated the Euro-
pean Conventi6n. s When the United Kingdom rejected Soering's claims,
he turned to the European Court of Human Rights for relief.5
Soering claimed that his extradition would violate the rights afforded
him by the European Convention, 6 because a sentence of death and con-
finement on death row qualified as cruel treatment, which the treaty prohib-
ited. 7 The European Court agreed with Soering, holding that the United
Kingdom would violate the European Convention if it extradited Soering
to the United States to face a crime punishable by death." Basing its holding
on Article 3 of the European Convention, the European Court stated the
following:
[T]he decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise
to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that
State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown
for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in the requesting country."
In finding that capital punishment created such a risk to Soering, the court
relied heavily upon what it deemed the "death row phenomenon," or the
50. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11.
51. Id at 11-12.
52. Id.
53. This commission enforces the European Convention to which the United Kingdom
is a party. See European Convention, supra note 33.
54. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 30-31.
55. Quigley, supra note 35, at 418-19.
56. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 30-31.
57. European Convention, supra note 33, art. 3.
58. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45.
59. Id at 45.
[Vol. 11:2
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result of the lengthy detention time on death row and the physical and
psychological stress created by the prolonged waiting.
6
0
The Soering decision greatly impacted extradition law, particularly in
Europe and the United States.6' First, this decision mandated that requested
European nations, before granting extradition, ensure that no foreseeable
harm will be done to an extraditee within its own boundaries or within
those of the requesting nation.62 Second, this "foreseeable consequences"
test standardized death penalty extradition review in Europe, clarifying what
the European Convention required of its members. 6' Finally, in finding that
this extradition violated Article 3 of the European Convention, the Court
provided a means for abolitionist countries to protect their citizens and to
preserve the "right to life."
B. The Soering Aftermath
The United Nations Human Rights Committee faced a situation
similar to Soering in the case of Kindler v. Canada."' After being convicted
60. Id The "death row phenomenon" is made up of the following elements: (1) how
long the defendant is incarcerated prior to his execution; and (2) the death row conditions,
particularly the mental anguish. Id at 42-43. In addition to the "death row phenomenon,"
the court also factored in the following conditions to its decision: (1) the defendant was
eighteen at the time of the crimes; (2) the defendant had been diagnosed with a mental
disorder in which a person becomes strongly influenced by another person; and (3) the West
German government had also sought to extradite Soering to Germany. Id at 12, 14.
61. See also Ahnrad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 1063
(2d Cir. 1990). In Arhmad, the court deemed the Soering decision "an important precedent on
the refusal to extradite because of anticipated torture, cruel conditions of incarceration or
lack of due.process at trial in the requesting country." Id. at 414. The Ahmad court further
concluded that Soering accurately depicted the "present status of international and human
rights law on this issue." Id. at 413. Though the Soering decision substantially affected
international extradition law, it is Jens Soering himself who has felt and continues to feel its
greatest impact. In February 1999, a federal district court judge found all three of Soering's
appellate claims that he deserved a new trial to be without merit. Michael Hemphill, Judge
Rejects Soering's Claims, No New Murder Trial in Bedford Killings, ROANOKE TIMES, February
25, 1999, at B4. Soering is currently serving two life sentences. Id
62. Id at 33-34. The European Court subjected not only the actions of the United
Kingdom, but also the actions of the United States, to the requirements of the European
Convention. Id
63. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 552-53.
64. Kindler v. Canada, (No. 470/1991), UN Doc. A/48/40, Vol. II, p. 138, views
adopted on July 30, 1993, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993). Other judicial bodies besides the
United Nations Human Rights Committee [hereinafter UNHRC] faced cases resembling
Soering, such as the High Court in the Netherlands. John Dugard & Christine Van Den
Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 193 (1998)
(citing Netherlands v. Short, HR 30 Mar. 1990, NJ 249 (A. H. J. Swart), excerpted and
translated in 29 ILM 1375 (1990), and in 22 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 432 (1991)). In Netherlands
v. Short, the United States requested extradition of an American soldier (Short), accused of
murdering his wife, from the Netherlands. Dugard & Van Den Wyngaert, 92 AM. J. INT'L
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of murder and kidnaping in Pennsylvania, Joseph Kindler, a Canadian
citizen, escaped from prison and returned to Canada.6" Canadian authorities
later arrested Kindler and a request for extradition from the United States
followed.6 The Supreme Court of Canada found the extradition, despite its
lack of any assurances, not to be contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms." The UNHRC called for a delay in the extradition, but the
Canadian government turned Kindler over to the United States the same
day that the Supreme Court announced its decision.6"
The UNHRC later concluded that Kindler's extradition did not violate
the ICCPR,69 making the following findings: (1) Kindler's "death row
phenomenon" claims failed;'0 (2) the ICCPR contains no prohibition against
the death penalty;71 and (3) under the ICCPR, requested nations are not
obligated to deny death penalty extraditions or to demand assurances from
the requesting nation.72 Distinguishing Soering, the UNHRC emphasized
L. at 193. The United States based its request on the 1951 NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment between it and the Netherlands. Id After the United States declined to give any
assurances that it would not seek the death penalty, the Dutch trial court conducted a
balancing test in which it found that Short's interest in not being extradited should supersede
the Dutch interest in turning him over to the United States. Id The United States thereafter
decided not to indict Short for a capital crime; the Netherlands then extradited him. Id
65. Kindler, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 307-09.
66. Id
67. Id. at 314.
68. Id. at 308.
69. Id. at314.
70. Id Kindler's complaint read in part as follows:
The author claims that the decision to extradite him violates articles 6, 7,.9, 14
and 26 of the Covenant. He submits that the death penalty per se constitutes
cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, and that conditions on death row
are cruel, inhuman and degrading. He further alleges that the judicial procedures
in Pennsylvania, inasmuch as they relate specifically to capital punishment, do
not meet basic requirements of justice.
Id at 308. In arguing his claims, Kindler referenced the "death row phenomenon" doctrine
which the European Court had upheld in Soering. Id at 312-13. Nonetheless, the UNHRC
had previously rejected this doctrine, stating that "'prolongued judicial proceedings do not
per se constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, even if they can be a source of
mental strain for the convicted persons.'" Id at 309 (citing Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v.
Jamaica, Communications Nos. 210/1986,225/1987, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989)). Furthermore, the Kindler court
opined that the alleged lengthy detention periods were not cruel and inhuman treatment
because they frequently resulted from the numerous appeals filed by the defendant. Id As
a basis for rejecting Kindler's claim, the UNHRC also discussed the plenary review given
Kindler's conviction because courts in both the United States and Canada had reexamined
the evidence in his case prior to any extradition decision. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 314. As to the issue of "assurances," this decision appears to have given
requested nations two means by which to handle death penalty extraditions. DeWitt, supra
note 25, at n.96. A requested state can employ the "foreseeable harm" test and if satisfied
[Vol. 1 1:2
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that Kindler was not a minor at the time of the crime, he had no mental
deficiencies, and he failed to proffer evidence as to the penal conditions in
Pennsylvania." In providing guidance to courts for future situations like
Kindler's case, the UNHRC enumerated the following as pertinent criteria:
(1) relevant personal characteristics of the fugitive; (2) the particular circum-
stances surrounding death row imprisonment; and (3) whether the pro-
scribed form of execution is "particularly abhorrent."74
C. Italy Denies Extradition to the United States
In December of 1993, a disgruntled restaurant owner- who had been
experiencing financial problems murdered a state government collection
agent in Florida.7" The restauranteur, Pietro Venezia, was an Italian national
who had moved to America fifteen years earlier.76 Shortly after the murder,
Venezia returned to Italy where he evaded authorities for more than four
months before being captured in his home province in Italy.7
1. Venezia's Extradition Proceedings
The lower court and the appellate court both approved the United
States request for extradition thereby subjecting the action to review by the
Italian Justice Minister.8 Following the extradition treaty between Italy and
the United States,79 the Justice Minister requested assurances from the
United States that it would not use capital punishment. Once the United
with the extraditionv, return the fugitive to the requesting state without any assurances. Id
Alternatively, the requested state can demand assurances from the requesting state and forego
any use of the 'foreseeable harm" test. Id.
73. Id at 314.
74. Id. The UNHRC later addressed this issue in a 1994 case involving Charles Ng, a
British citizen and U.S. resident, who fled the U.S. for Canada after being suspected of killing
twelve people in California. Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994), at 189. Concentrat-
ing its inquiry on California's method of execution, cyanide gas asphyxiation, the UNHRC
found that in extraditing Ng to the United States, Canada violated the ICCPR. Id at 205.
Specifically, the UNHRC concluded that cyanide gas asphyxiation did not qualify as
punishment causing "the least possible physical and mental suffering," as proscribed by the
ICCPR. Id With this decision, the UNHRC imposed on requested nations the obligation
to use ICCPR standards in determining whether to extradite, thereby creating "a level of
uniformity" for countries bound by the ICCPR. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 560.
75. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 566 (citing Robert Graham, Allies at Odds over Extradi-
tion, FIN. TIMES (London), July 8, 1996, at 9)).
76. Id at 565-66.
77. Id at 567.
78. Id. at 568.
79. Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, TIAS No. 10,837,24 ILM 1525 (1985)
(entered into force Sept. 24, 1984).
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States offered such assurances, the Justice Minister found the extradition
permissible under the bilateral treaty and Italian law.8"
Venezia eventually appealed the Minister's decision to the Italian
Constitutional Court, arguing that both the Italian statute incorporating the
U.S.-Italy extradition treaty and an article in the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure violated the Italian Constitution.81 The Italian Constitution
preserves basic human rights and prohibits capital punishment.82 Con-
versely, the two provisions which Venezia challenged stated the following:
[W]hen the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by
death under the laws of the requesting Party, extradition shall be refused,
unless the requesting Party provides such assurances as the requested
Party considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or,
if imposed, shall not be executed. 3
2. The Italian Constitutional Court's Ruling
In ruling on Venezia's argument, the Italian Constitutional Court held
both the article of the Code of the Criminal Procedure in question and the
statute incorporating the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty, specifically Article
IX, to be unconstitutional. The court examined two principal issues in
reaching this decision.8" First, the court evaluated the weight of the Italian
Constitution's prohibitions against the death penalty and inhuman treat-
ment in the context of extradition cases.86 These prohibitions are derived
from the absolute "right to life," one of the fundamental human rights
guaranteed by the Italian Constitution.87 Determining that this absolute
right applied to the actions of all public officials, the court found that the
80. Andrea Bianchi, International Decision, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 727 (1997). Note
that while Venezia sought these various appeals, much controversy over capital punishment
existed within Italy. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 569 & nn.165-66. While Venezia's attorney
used this conflict to strengthen support for his client, abolitionist groups used Venezia to
further their cause. d
81. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 727. Venezia challenged Article 698, paragraph 2, of the
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, which required that a judicial court and the Justice
Minister review extradition requests. DeWitt, supra note 25, at n.175. Venezia also argued
against Article IX of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty which placed the determination of the
adequacy of a requesting nation's assurances within the discretion of the Justice Minister. Ia
82. Id at 727-28.
83. Ia at 727 (quoting Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 698 & U.S.-Italy
Extradition Treaty, supra note 79, art. IX, at 3031).
84. Id at 728.
85. See id.; DeWitt, supra note 25, at 571.
86. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 728.
87. IL (citing COST. arts. 2 & 27).
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"right to life" superseded the need for cooperation in international judicial
matters, including extradition proceedings.88
The court then turned to the issue of whether the assurances given by
a requesting nation could adequately protect the guarantees offered by the
Italian Constitution." Relying on the Italian Constitution's prohibition
against the death penalty and the absoluteness of the "right to life," the court
held that "sufficient assurances" that capital punishment will not be enforced
are inherently unconstitutional.' The court stated that the determination
of "sufficient assurances" necessitates a reliance upon the discretion of public
officials, and such discretion makes improbable the extraditee's right to
absolute protection.9 Consequently, the only assurances which the Italian
Constitutional Court would seemingly accept as adequate for extradition are
those which are absolute.'
The United States had assured the Italian government that it would not
seek the death penalty against Venezia, reiterating this promise in a letter
from the U.S. Department of Justice."' In light of the fact that he would be
tried in a state court, Venezia questioned these assurances because they came
from the federal government and potentially had no binding effect on the
state.94 In response, the Italian Government, relying on the United States
oral and written assurances, argued that the Supremacy Clause in the United
States Constitution mandates that all international treaties are the "supreme
law of the land." 5 Therefore, these federal assurances would take precedent
88. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 728; DeWitt, supra note 25, at n.176. The Italian Consti-
tutional Court had previously held that any effort made by Italy to impose penalties "'which
in no hypothesis, and for no kind of crime, would be inflicted in Italy in time of peace'"
constituted a constitutional violation. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 728 (quoting Re Cuilhier,
Ciamborrani & Vallon, 78 ILR 93, 99 (Corte cost. 1979) (discussing a constitutional challenge
to a national law incorporating the 1870 Extradition Treaty between Italy and France to the
extent it allowed the extradition of fugitives from Italy to France for crimes punishable by
death)). Similarly, the UNHRC and the European Court have given the rights afforded by
the ICCPR and the European Convention comparable preeminence. DeWitt, supra note 25,
at n.176.
89. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 728.
90. Id
91. Id
92. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 573.
93. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 729. The letter from the United States to the Italian
Ministry of Justice clarified that according to Article VI of the United States Constitution,
international treaties qualified as the supreme law of the land, and consequently superseded
any contradictory state law. Id at 729. But cf Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1355 (1998)
(rejecting defendant's argument that he had a viable Vienna Convention claim because as an
international treaty, the Vienna Convention constituted "the supreme law of the land," and
consequently trumped Virginia's procedural default doctrine); Mary K. Martin, Case Note,
11 CAP. DEF. J. 39 (1998) (analyzing Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998)).
94. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 572.
95. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
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over any state law or state constitution." The Italian Constitutional Court
left this question open, instead making its broader ruling that no "sufficient
assurances" could satisfy the constitutional requirements of absolute protec-
tion.9"
Arguably, the Italian Constitutional Court could have addressed this
issue and still maintained its position that "sufficient assurances" were
unconstitutional." If the court believed that the Italian Constitution called
for absolute assurances, not subject to discretionary review, then it simply
could have interpreted the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty accordingly.99 One
possible explanation for the court's decision not to pursue this line of
reasoning is that it simply placed more emphasis on constitutional
protections such as the "right to life," than on the need to reconcile the
U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty and the Italian Constitution.1" Simply stated,
the court chose to strike down part of an extradition treaty rather than to
send a man to a country which could potentially deny him his "right to
life."
3. Implications of the Venezia Decision
The Venezia case generated a significant amount of publicity, gaining
the attention of many Italian citizens.1"' Some disagreement over the use of
the death penalty existed," 2 but the focus of much of the outrage in Italy
arose out of the struggle between "Italian sovereignty and American strong-
arm politics."0 3 Italian politicians and citizens, already unhappy with the
American judicial system,' °4 saw this case as an opportunity to put Italy in
the forefront of international abolitionism and to let the United States know
that Italy did not support the death penalty and would not aid in its facilita-
tion.' Public outcry prompted the Italian Constitutional Court to hear
96. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 572 & n. 181.
97. Id. at 573.
98. Id. at 575.
99. Id In demanding absolute assurances, the court could require states, in addition to
federal officials, to commit to a non-capital prosecution. Id. at 576. It is suggested that a state
could satisfy such a commitment by enacting legislation, making an executive agreement, or
by obtaining a judicial order. Id. at n.201.
100. Id at 576-77.
101. Id at 569-570.
102. Id at 569 & n. 165 (noting that in 1991 almost 60% of Italians supported reinstating
capital punishment but by 1996 the percentage had declined to 45.7% (citingJohn Tagliabue,
Italians'Extradition RulingMay Hamper War on Organized Crime, HOUSTON CHRON., June
28, 1996, at 22A)).
103. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 570.
104. Robert Graham, Allies at Odds OverExtradition, FIN. TIMES (London), July 8,1996,
at 9.
105. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 569.
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Venezia's case and, it is likely, to reach the decision it did.1° Reactions such
as this are demonstrative of the power which citizens in abolitionist states
can wield in not only their own countries, but in the United States as well.
This apparent distrust of the American judicial system by the citizens
of Italy extended to Italian judicial and governmental officials. Both the
Italian parliament and the Italian Constitutional Court doubted the suffi-
ciency of the assurances given to them by the United States. Past actions by
the United States and its continued use of the death penalty prevented the
court from believing that if it approved extradition, Venezia would not be
executed. Such a complete lack of faith on Italy's part could be a predictor
of the opinions of other abolitionist countries, and consequently an indica-
tion of the outcomes in future extradition proceedings between them and
the United States.
IV The Future ofDeath Penalty Extraditions in the United States
The state of death penalty extradition law is currently on the brink of
change. With the present balance between the number of abolitionist and
retentionist countries tipping in favor of the abolitionists, death penalty
extraditions have become more difficult. Growing international sentiment
against capital punishment can simply no longer be ignored even in the
context of extradition controversies arising out of conflicting domestic laws.
A. Measure by Measure: The Progression ofExtradition Law
Cases such as Soering, Kindler, and Venezia, demonstrate a progression
in international extradition law. The executive branches of governments at
one time had exclusive control over extradition proceedings. Nonetheless,
with the emergence of international human rights agreements, judicial
bodies, both international and domestic, gained more power in reviewing
extradition decisions. Similarly, in Soering and Kindler, human rights
agreements prevailed over provisions in bilateral extradition treaties.
107
Furthermore, these decisions allowed for a requested nation to inquire into
the judicial and penal conditions of the requesting nation before deciding to
extradite. Each of these measures translated into the growing preeminence
of international human rights as a factor in extradition proceedings.
The Venezia decision represents the latest progression because the
Italian Constitutional Court, unlike the Soering and Kindler courts, did not
even reach the inquiry into the existing conditions in the United States."10
Instead, examining only its (Italian) domestic law, the court determined that
a death penalty extradition would violate the Italian Constitution's protec-
106. Id. at 569-70. See also Bianchi, supra note 80, at n.7.
107. DeWitt, supra note 25, at 560-61.
108. Id at 583-84.
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tion of the "right to life." Consequently, abolitionist countries now have
the choice of refusing extradition to the United States based on international
human rights agreements or their constitutions and domestic laws.
B. New Groundsfor Refusing to Extradite
As a result of this choice and the international human rights factor,
abolitionist countries have an increased number of grounds on which to
challenge death penalty extraditions to the United States." For instance,
many human rights agreements forbid the execution of juvenile offenders1 '
and the mentally retarded.' However, the United States, in spite of inter-
national objections, permits the execution of both of these classes of per-
sons."' In 1998 alone, three juvenile offenders were executed, two in Texas
and one in Virginia, and two men suffering from mental retardation were
executed."3 If the extraditee falls within either of these classes, the requested
nation could deny extradition based on a human rights agreement or on one
of its own laws if such a prohibition exists.
Other grounds for refusing extradition to the United States include the
alleged racial discrimination which exists in capital cases." 4 Racial discrimi-
nation is prohibited by human rights law."' Nonetheless, the American
death penalty system is often accused of discriminating on the basis of
race." 6 If abolitionist countries believed that race is in fact a discriminatory
109. Quigley, supra note 35, at 434-35.
110. See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 6(5).
111. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: THE DEATH PENALTY:
A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 42 (1989); Death Penalty Information Center, TheDeath Penalty in
1998: Year End Report (visited Feb. 21, 1999) < http://ww-w.essential.org/orga/dpic/
yrendrpt98.htm > (statingthat virtually all of the other countries in the world do not execute
people who are under eighteen at the time of commission of their crime).
112. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that any individual over the
age of sixteen can be subject to execution); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding
that the execution of mentally retarded capital murderers of the defendant's mental ability
[an IQ between fifty and sixty-three with a mental age of a six-and-a-half year old] was not
categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). See also Julian S. Nicholls, Comment,
Too Young to Die: International Law and the Imposition of the Juvenile Death Penalty, 5
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 617 (1991); Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation, Propriety of Imposing
Capital Punishment on Mentally Retarded Individuals, 20 A.L.R. 5th 177 (1998).
113. Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty in 1998: Year End Report
(visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/orga/dpic/yrendrpt98.htm>.
114. Quigley, supra note 35, at 435.
115. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES S 702(i) (1987); European Convention, supra note 33, art. 14.
116. See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, witb Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998). In a recent systematic review of empirical studies conducted
in the 1970s and the 1980s, the General Accounting Office made the following findings: (1)
in eighty-two percent of the studies, the race of the victim was found to have influenced the
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factor in the American death penalty system, they could reason that an
extraditee's human rights would be violated if he were sent to the United
States to stand trial.
The appellate review system in the United States also represents a
potential violation of the domestic laws of other nations.' Many other
countries provide for a broader scope for appellate review than that of the
United States. " Consequently, if the requested nation engages in a compar-
ison of its appellate review with that of the United States and finds such
discrepancies, it could refuse extradition.
Finally, the treatment of burdens of proof in affirmative defenses raises
the issue of a likely human rights violation in the United States." 9 Interna-
tional human rights law operates under a presumption of innocence for the
defendant; even when the defendant raises a defense, it is the prosecution
who must disprove the defense. 20 Conversely, in the United States, the
accused is typically required to. prove the elements of any affirmative de-
fenses.' Such a divergence could give rise to a requested nation's denial of
a United States extradition request.
C Forcible Abduction: A Possible Alternative to Extradition
If the success of the United States in extraditing fugitives continues to
decline, as evidenced by recent international decisions, it may employ
alternative means of "relocating" fugitives to American soil. One such
alternative, currently being practiced by the United States, is the forcible
likelihood of the accused being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty,
i.e. those who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than
those who murdered blacks; (2) in more than half of the studies, the race of the defendant was
found to have influenced the likelihood of being charged with a capital crime or receiving the
death penalty; (3) the relationship between the defendant and the outcome of the case varied
across studies. Id. at 1658-60 (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATrERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990)).
117. Quigley, supra note 35, at 436.
118. Id at 436-37.
119. 14 at 437-38.
120. ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 14(2); European Convention, supra note 33, art. 6(2).
121. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 230 (1987) (finding that though the state must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element of the offense charged,
it may place on defendants the burden of proving any affirmative defenses); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197,206-07 (1977) (concluding that defendant charged with murder who says
he was provoked by the victim, must prove provocation under a preponderance of the
evidence standard); United States v. Vachon, 869 F.2d 653, 659 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that
defendant has the burden of proving an insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence);
Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and Sufficiency ofProofofMental Irresponsibil-
ity in Criminal Cases, 17 A.L.R. 3d 146 (1968) (stating that some states require the defendant
to prove an insanity defense); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law S 52 (1989) (stating that some states
place the burden of proving duress upon the defendant).
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abduction of the fugitive from the requested nation. The United States
Supreme Court approved of such "forcible abductions" in United States v.
A lva rez-Machain."22
In Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen, suspected of participating in the
murder of a federal agent and his pilot, was forcibly kidnaped from his
home in Mexico and flown to Texas to stand trial.123 The Court held that
the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty should not be read to incorporate an
implicit provision forbidding the prosecution of a defendant obtained by
means other than those provided for in the treaty. 2 ' The treaty did not
expressly forbid "forcible abduction," so, in the opinion of six United States
Supreme Court Justices, the United States could employ it as an alternative
to extradition.
The Alvarez-Machain holding has recently been applied in a Virginia
Supreme Court case in which FBI agents "forcibly abducted" a Pakistani
citizen, accused of murdering two people in Virginia, from a Pakistani hotel
and returned him to the United States. 2 No extradition treaty between the
United States and Pakistan exists, so the court instead relied upon the U.S.-
United Kingdom Extradition Treaty.'26 Following Alvarez-Machain, the
Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that because the treaty did not prohibit
trying a defendant acquired by "forcible abduction" in either express or
implied terms, the United States had jurisdiction over Aimal Kasi."'
"Forcible abduction" is certainly a drastic alternative to extradition, but
for the United States, it is a legitimate one. Attempts can be made to
122. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
123. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
124. Id at 666, 668-69.
125. Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998). In Kasi, the police suspected Kasi
of murdering two people and wounding three others in a 1993 shooting that occurred outside
of the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Fairfax, Virginia. Id. at 59. Almost
four and a half years later, Federal Bureau of Investigation [hereinafter FBI] agents located
and apprehended Kasi. Id. At approximately 4:00 a.m., four FBI agents, dressed in "native
clothing," knocked on a hotel room door in Pakistan. Id. at 60-61. When Kasi opened the
door, the agents rushed into the room, and after several minutes, they subdued, handcuffed,
and gagged him. Id. at 61. After leaving the hotel, the agents and the defendant, who was
now handcuffed, shackled, and had a hood placed over his head, drove in a car for approxi-
mately an hour and then took an hour-long flight. Id The agents then transported Kasi in
a vehicle to a "holding facility" where Pakistani authorities took custody of Kasi. Id He
stayed in the holding facility until the morning of June 17th when Pakistani officials released
him into the custody of the FBI agents. Id The agents then accompanied Kasi on a twelve
hour flight back to the United States. Id On the return flight, Kasi signed an FBI "Advice
of Rights" form, waived his rights, and gave both an oral and written statement of the events
surrounding the CIA shootings. Id For discussion of this and other issues raised by Kasi, see
Douglas R. Banghart, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 437 (1999) (analyzing Kasi v. Common-
wealth, 508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998)).
126. Kasi, 508 S.E.2d at 62-63.
127. Id at 63.
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distinguish Alvarez-Machain by closely reading the language of the extradi-
tion treaty being applied, and arguing that such language only allows for the
removal of the fugitive by the means enumerated in the treaty. Nonethe-
less, the United States may begin to implement this alternative to extradi-
tion more frequently if abolitionist countries increase their denials of
extraditions.
V Conclusion
The fate of Atif Rafay, Sebastian Burns, and other death penalty
extraditees remains uncertain, but given the recent changes in international
extradition law, the scales may be tipping in their favor. If the Supreme
Court of Canada does in fact deny their extradition to the United States, it
will mean another step in the progression of the incorporation of human
rights into international extradition law. Another abolitionist country will
convey the message to the United States that it will not assist in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty.
The reconciliation of abolitionists and retentionists on the issue of
death penalty extradition is not a hopeless cause. Solutions, which enable
one country to maintain its commitment to protecting human rights and
another country to punish appropriately those violating its laws exist. For
instance, an abolitionist country and the United States could draft an extra-
dition treaty which allows for extradition if the requesting country agrees
to use the same punishment that the requested country would have used for
the crime in question. If the United States is unwilling to make such com-
promises in extradition proceedings, then it must be prepared to fight what
is rapidly becoming an uphill battle for those countries retaining capital
punishment.
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